Appellant buyer challenged the judgment

Appellant buyer challenged the judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County (California), which ruled in respondent seller's favor on her cross-complaint against the buyer for slander of title to real property and for quieting title thereto, ruled against the buyer on her cross-complaint, and decreed the buyer to be the owner of money held in an escrow account, in a title company's interpleader action to determine ownership of the money.

The seller sought damages for slander of title to her real property, which was the subject of a sales contract between the parties, and for a decree quieting title thereto as a result of the buyer's execution and recordation of a document which rescinded the purchase contract and accused the seller of fraud and misrepresentation. The buyer sought the return of money she had put into escrow and repayment of her deposit. For the knowledge of employee rights visit the employee rights attorney Los Angeles.

On appeal, the buyer argued that the evidence did not support the judgment in the seller's favor on the slander of title action and that the seller was not entitled to recover the attorney fees incurred in clearing her slandered title. The appellate court held that (1) the evidence supported the verdict where the buyer had no legal basis for rescinding the contract because there was no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the seller, and there was evidence that the buyer disparaged the seller's title by recording a document containing false accusations with knowledge that the document would cloud the seller's title, which constituted implied malice; and (2) the seller was entitled to attorney fees for quieting title to her land as special damages.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, which held in favor of the seller on her slander of title claim against the buyer and decreed the buyer to be the owner of money in escrow.

Petitioner, defendant in the action below, sought a writ of mandate to compel respondent, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583, as it was not brought to trial within two years of the date of filing.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner for failure to prosecute pursuant to § 583. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to dismiss the action. Denying the writ, the court held that § 583(a) placed no restrictions on the exercise of the trial court's discretion and contained no requirement that the motion to dismiss be granted unless opposed by an adequate showing of diligence or excuse for delay. The court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The affidavit filed by plaintiffs' attorney did not set forth any facts showing an excuse for the delay and the record did not reflect what showing was made orally at the hearing. However, a judgment of the trial court was presumed correct and all presumptions were to be indulged to support it on matters as to which the record was silent. The policy underlying § 583, which was to prevent unreasonable delays in litigation, was less important than that seeking to dispose of litigation on the merits.

The court discharged the alternative writ of mandamus and denied the petition for a peremptory writ.